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ARGUMENT 
I. ABANDONMENT WAS NOT TRIED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
WITH EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT. 
The issue of abandonment was not tried by either express or implied consent. For 
an issue to be ruled on by implied consent, it must be "squarely raised" and "fully aired" 
at trial. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 1A\ P.2d 956, 957-58 (Utah 1997). The law 
clearly states that "Proof of abandonment of such an easement requires action releasing the 
ownership and the right to use with clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment." 
Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765 (Utah 1962). The issues of release of ownership and 
right to use were not raised or tried by implied consent. 
First, abandonment was not tried by implied or express consent if the Lances never 
raised the issue and it was not "squarely raised" or "fully aired" before the trial court. 
The burden of proving abandonment belongs to the party asserting it. See Provo River 
Water Users Ass'n v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1982). The Lances failed to 
meet this burden. They failed to raise, expressly or impliedly, the legal issues of intent to 
abandon or actual abandonment and consequently, these issues were not expressly or 
impliedly tried before the trial court. As such, Mr. Lunt was prejudiced by the trial 
court's ruling on abandonment because he had no opportunity to address intent to 
abandon or present evidence against actual abandonment of his easement on the Lane. 
The Lances assert that they did not have to amend the pleadings to include 
abandonment because abandonment was tried by implied consent. If, as in the Clark 
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case, the issue of abandonment had "been squarely raised" and "fully aired" at the trial 
such an argument would apply. See Clark 741 P.2d at 957-58. However, the issue of 
abandonment was only raised for the first time by Judge Pullan during the Lances closing 
argument. R. 959 at 357:21-23. At that time, the Lances admitted that they had not even 
looked at the issue of abandonment. R. 959 at 358. This is in essence an admission that 
the issue of abandonment was raised for the first time by the Court in closing argument. 
As such, abandonment was not squarely raised or fully aired. 
Finally, the Lances misapply the burden of proving the issue of abandonment. 
They allege without supporting testimony or documentation that "clear evidence of 
abandonment was presented, much of it by Cross Appellant Lunt." Reply Brief at 15. 
Mr. Lunt had no reason to present evidence of abandonment. Not only is the prescriptive 
easement still in use, it would be adverse to his own position of establishing a prescriptive 
easement to present evidence of abandonment. Tellingly, the Lances do not cite any 
testimony or evidence from the record to show this "clear evidence" of abandonment 
allegedly presented by Mr. Lunt. 
In short, for the trial court to have found that Mr. Lunt abandoned the easement, 
the Lances had to meet the burden of showing by "clear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence" that Mr. Lunt intended to abandon the Lane and actually did abandon use of the 
Lane. Tuttle v. Sowadski, 126 P. 959, 965 (Utah 1912). The Lances have failed to meet 
this burden. They did not offer evidence at trial and are unable, even now, to muster 
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that 
intent J carried into effect." Botkin v. Kickapoo, Inc., 505 P.2d 749, 752 (Kan. 
1973) I \. Lunt did not impliedly consent to try the issue of abandonment. As such, the 
trial court was incorrect to rule that Mi I i nit abandoned portions of I he Luiie. 
.•HE SCOPE OF THE LANE'S USE DURING THE PRESCRIPTIVE 
PERIOD WAS FOR INGRESS/EGRESS FOR RESIDENTIAL AND 
AGRICULTURAL NEEDS, CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENT 
USE OF THE LANE. 
I he historical and prescriptive use of the I ,ane is broad and applies gencrall) lo 
residential and agricultural use. Great deference should be granted to the trial court's finding 
regarding the u>ct>fik •!, u.-. r ingress/egress. VccOrtnnv Ca^trr 0?0P.2d 1254, 1256 (ITtah 
. . . , - . :c m use is 
without merit and entirely unsupported by the record. There has been no significant change in 
use of the I ane such to constitute an abandoi n nei it oft! le easement b> Mi I \ int, i 101 is the \ ise 
limited to agricultural use. 
The trial court made clear that the use of the lane was for broad and general ingress/egress 
relied on the lane to "access the rear of 
their respective acreage" for both residential and agricultural purposes. R. at 729, The coi irt 
luiihci toncliiili il ill ii Mi I nun |!iu\ rd Hit M dcniciih 1»\ i leai iind com lining n iiluio A/. 
The trial court based this conclusion on w hat it termed '"particularly credible" testimony from 
Elden Carlisle that both parties used the Lane to access their properties from the I *M(>'s lo I he 
1950's, R. 958 at 114-127; R. 728. "I estimoiiy from Monaves Boren, Jack Lunt, and Garth Lunt 
cited to in the initial brief, as well as in the trial court's decision, clearly and convincingly 
supported the conclusion that the Lane was used as a driveway to access both properties for 
residential and agricultural purposes. Great deference should be granted to the trial court's 
finding regarding the use of the Lane for ingress/egress. 
The Lane was historically and is currently used as a driveway to meet residential and 
agricultural needs. After trial, the Lances requested that the order describing the easement allow 
only "ingress, human and vehicular, ingress and egress and no other use." Hearing Transcript, 
Electronically Recorded Feb. 16, 2006, p. 7. The Lances indicated at that time that they were 
concerned with potential underground use of the easement for utility easements. They also 
requested a ruling from Judge Pullan to define the scope and use of the easement from the bench. 
Id. at 8. Judge Pullan acquiesced by refusing to limit the use beyond the memorandum decision 
and reasserting the broad nature of the easement, consistent with residential and agricultural use. 
Id. at 8, 10. While the Lane was driven on to meet agricultural needs, the main purpose for using 
the Lane was and still is for property ingress and egress. 
Now, the Lances labor to redefine the trial court's finding that the use of the easement is 
consistent with the use of a driveway and meets both residential and agricultural needs. The 
Lances argue that the current use of the easement is incompatible with the original use and 
therefore extinguishment or abandonment of the easement has occurred. This argument asks this 
Court to view the use of the prescriptive easement in a very narrow and unrealistic way. 
In addition, the fact that the ingress and egress is not limited solely to agriculture, but 
recognizes other uses for a driveway, does not increase the burden on the Lances property. The 
Lances continue to claim that the historical use of the lane was for "agricultural purposes" only. 
This claim is derived from testimony of the witnesses as they stated that agricultural equipment, 
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hay, and animals vveie liansporh'J In (hi" Li> k M lh' prnpnh h usr of (he 1 me. "I his argument 
ignores the testimony that ears were parked on the Lane and vehicles have consistently used the 
Lane as a driveway to access the McNaughten/Lunt property The argument that agi ici lltural \ lse 
i unsliluh's (IK; suh" hislnrii al use of the Lane as "for agricultural purposes" is a very narrow, 
subjective, and unworkable interpretation of the facts. Drawing the conclusion that the Lane was 
used sole I;, ilni ajpin, iiliiiiiil fiiii poses" coiiipldd) ifnous (in1 puipnsi o( ilir r.isemenf The 
McNaughtens and the Lunts did not need an easement for the agricultural purpose of a place to 
move hay, machinery, or drive livestock up and down. Rather, the pi lipose of the easement w as 
McNaughtens/Lunts access to the rear of their property via the driveway for 
agricultural and residential purposes. 
I he I ances ha\ e failed t :> prodi ice ai v • e\ idence to show 1:1 lat the> si iffer an increased 
burden property as agricultural use has slowed and residential use iemained consistent. There are 
few vehicles that even use the I ,ane and ai i.) bi u den 01 i tl le I ances ft 0111 It lis prescripts e 
easement is negligible. The only change to the u ^ uf the Lane has come with the type of vehicle, 
new cars rather than farm machinery, and the lack of livestock being run on the Lane. Mr. I imt 
ivn. Lunt and those 
currently living on the property have shown just the opposite by continually using the Lane for 
ingress and egress to the reai of the proper t> 
HI. THE COURT ERRED BY LIMITING THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE 
EASEMENT. 
"I Itah ca.se law clearlj states that the physical measure and limit of a prescripts e easement 
is to be determined by its use during the prescriptive period. See McBride v. Mcliride, 58 i P.2d 
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996, 997 (Utah 1978); see also Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). The 
witnesses for the Lances estimated the length of the Lane to be anywhere from 150 feet at the 
shortest, to approximately 200 feet. All of the Lances' witnesses based their testimony on the 
length of the Lane on estimation from their memory of the Lane. None of the Lances' witnesses 
testified that they actually measured the Lane. 
On the other hand, the witnesses called by Mr. Lunt all testified that the Lane was 235 to 
247 feet in length. This testimony was made from actual measurements taken by the parties. 
The testimony of Mr. Lunt's witnesses was far more credible than the testimony of the Lances' 
witnesses as it was based on actual measurements. The testimony provided by the Lances' 
witnesses was based on estimations and memories of buildings long since torn down. (See R. 
959 at 264-267; R. 959 at 258). Therefore, the trial court erred when it limited the length of the 
easement to 180 feet. The record, and the trial court's findings, clearly support a holding that the 
length of the easement was and is at least 235 feet in length. This Court should issue an order 
finding that the length of the easement is at least 235 feet. 
In regards to the width of the easement, the record reflects testimony that the historical 
width was approximately 34 to 35 feet. (See R. 958 at 182 and R. 958 at 135-136). In fact, the 
Lances' witness, Mr. Duane Smith testified that the Lane was approximately 40 feet in width. R. 
959 at 258). The evidence presented at trial clearly supports a finding that the Lane should be 
approximately 34 feet in width. The trial court erred by finding the width of the Lane to be 20 
feet and this Court should issue an order finding the easement to be at least 34 feet wide. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Cross-Appellant Garth Lunt requests 
this Court to reverse the judgment of the court below in regard to the issue of abandonment and 
to issue an order finding the easement to be at least 235 feet in length by 34 feet in width as 
supported by the record, and together with all further relief the Court deems just and appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
DATED this \^\ day of September, 2007. 
BOSTWICK & PRICE P.C. 
, - % s ^ , 
Randy B. Birch 
Corey S. Yachman 
Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-Appelllant 
Mr. Garth Lunt 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARTH LUNT, 
Plaintiff, 
HAROLD LANCE and DIANA LANCE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 020500612 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
February 16, 2006 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DEREK P. PULLAN 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: Randy Birch 
_BIRCH LAW OFFICES 
_114 W. 200 W. 
Heber, UT 84032 
Telephone: (435)654-4300 
For the Defendant: Kraig Powell 
TESCH LAW OFFICES 
PO Box 3390 
314 Main Street, Ste. 201 
Park City, UT 84060 
Telephone: (4 3 5)649-0077 
Transcribed by: Beverly ],owe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on February 16, 2006) 
3 MR. BIRCH: Randy Birch appearing for and behalf of 
4 plaintiff, your Honor. 
5 MR. POWELL: Kraig Powell, your Honor, for Harold and 
6 Diana Lance. I apologize. We were discussing with Counsel. 
7 THE COURT: The Court decided this case by written 
8 memorandum decision several months back, I believe. I've read --
9 I reread that decision in preparation for today's hearing. 
10 There's an objection to the proposed order that I've reviewed. 
11 Have you been able to work those issues out? 
12 MR. BIRCH: We haven't, your Honor, and a couple of 
13 things. We did -- no, none of them, quite honestly. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. BIRCH: We've talked about two or three of them. 
16 The issue we were most recently trying to deal with is they 
17 prepared a conflicting survey that says that it's 150 feet from 
18 the eastern most corner to this gate, this road or this fence. 
19 Mel McCorry measured it and said it was 160. Christensen says 
20 it's 150. It sounds like they're both trying to go to the 
21 furthest east portion. I don't know whether they're off the same 
22 mark or not, but supposedly they're both coming from the gate and 
23 going towards the east. I don't know -- I don't know how to 
24 adjust it. 
25 I THE COURT: Okay. Well, do we need an evidentiary 
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1 hearing on that limited question? If it's a factual question I 
2 don't know how to resolve it if you can't do it yourselves. 
3 MR. POWELL: I hope we can resolve it, and maybe we 
4 could -- if necessary, depending on some of the other issues, we 
5 could set such a hearing and hopefully we'll be able to resolve 
6 it before then. 
7 THE COURT: Is there further disagreement about the 
8 width of the --
9 MR. BIRCH: Well, I think my letter, which I copied down 
10 accurately set forth my question about the width. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. BIRCH: I couldn't tell whether it was supposed to 
13 be 20 or 34. I believe there was two provisions that directly 
14 confJicted each other, so 1 prepared both and I submitted in the 
15 alternative to the Court, so as to hopefully avoid this hearing, 
16 but --
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 
18 MR. BIRCH: The width I don't know. 
19 THE COURT: It was my intent when I issued that decision 
20 that the width of the easement was at one period of time the 
21 broader width but that it had been abandoned, and what was --
22 what remained was a 20-foot width for purposes of a driveway is 
23 essentially what they had used it for from the mid '80's. 
24 MR. BIRCH: I didn't see anything in the findings that 
25 talked -- that they ever mentioned that the width was even 
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1 disputed. Indeed when the Court was out there the fence was 
2 still there. We looked at it. 
3 THE COURT: Yeah. 
4 MR. BIRCH: So that's why I didn't come to that 
5 conclusion. I did understand the abandonment on the land. 
6 THE COURT: Right. 
7 MR. POWELL: And your Honor, as I've indicated, our 
8 client at this point after considering the matter would certainly 
9 be willing to stipulate to the 20 feet because we interpreted the 
10 Court's ruling that way also. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, in my -- I had not seen the 
12 objection come in and had actually signed the 20-foot easement 
13 order that -- in findings and judgment that had been prepared. 
14 Yesterday I signed that, and then I realized that there was an 
15 objection. That was my intent from the beginning is that it 
16 would be the 20 feet, and that the balance of the easement had 
17 been abandoned. I would think that you could work out the 
18 distance between the gate and the property line. It seems to me 
19 that that's just the distance between two points, and I think --
20 MR. BIRCH: Well, I think clearly --
21 THE COURT: -- mathematicians would probably tell you --
22 MR. BIRCH: -- we all agree — 
23 THE COURT: -- there's only one distance there, so --
24 MR. BIRCH: You know, and that's the problem. I said, 
25 "Well, as long as you're measuring from the gate towards the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
road, I don't care where you stop because we've got the road." 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BIRCH: If it goes beyond the eastern boundary, so 
what, but there -- I think we could do this with the narrative 
and forget the legal, your Honor, because Moore's descriptions 
say legal description subject to an easement along the southern, 
northern, 20 foot. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BIRCH: And I think we could do that back to 
approximately 150 feet from 6th West. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. BIRCH: But approximately is not --
THE COURT: From the mid --
MR. BIRCH: -- is not adequate for -- if you want to go 
to center of road. I went out there today and --
THE COURT: From the center of the roadway. 
MR. BIRCH: -- there was about 180 feet from center of 
road. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BIRCH: Just to represent the Court, okay. I 
personally went out with my measuring tape, and I can bring it in 
for verification if you need, and I measured from the fence. I 
hooked on a metal thing that was in the middle of fence. I 
walked out and at 153 feet there's a telephone pole. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
1 MR. BIRCH: It's a newer pole that sits actually further 
2 west than another pole, but it's the main telephone pole. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 1 MR. BTRCH: At. 1 b b feet is where the mailboxes were 
5 planted, and at 180 feet is where the center of road --
6 approximate center of road was. Now it snowed today, so I'm out 
7 here doing this trying to figure center. 
8 THE COURT: Yeah. 
9 MR. BIRCH: But it was real close to 180 feet. 
10 THE COURT: This isn't the ruler that you measure your 
11 fish with, is it? 
12 MR. BIRCH: Nay, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
14 MR. POWELL: If I could briefly respond to that, your 
15 Honor, I think it is important for us to have a legal description 
16 because this is exactly the question that's going to come up. 
17 The reason it matters, your Honor, is in the broader context of 
18 this case, there is a parcel of land back there that the Court 
19 ruled that an easement has been abandoned. If an additional 10 
20 feet exists, somehow in the future interpretation beyond that 
21 gate due to an oversight that we make right now, then that 
22 easement will effectively not be abandoned in order to access 
23 that rear property. So I would like to get a surveyor and we 
24 could -- I think it's a Wasatch County monument. The only 
25 question -- we were on the phone right now with Mel McCorry and 
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1 Bing Christensen. The only question is whether that Wasatch 
2 County monument is somehow in dispute, and I don't think it is. 
3 I think we can resolve this pretty quickly, and then we will be 
4 able to --
5 THE COURT: It seems to me yeah, that you're right, that 
6 as long as we're measuring from the gate east that -- my ruling 
7 is that that gate is where it ends. 
8 MR. BIRCH: And those were the instructions that were 
9 given to the engineer. 
10 THE COURT: Yeah. So I'm -- if I gave you, I don't 
11 know, 30 days to work this out can you do it within that time 
12 period? 
13 MR. BIRCH: With regard to that issue, your Honor. The 
14 other concern that I had is in the objection that they raise, 
15 they wanted it limited to foot traffic or something. You know, 
16 the evidence is pretty clear that over the years there's been 
17 equipment and foot traffic and cars parked and whatnot. I'm 
18 trying to find their objection right now, but -- yeah. The 
19 defendants request that the easement say, quote, "Ingress, human 
20 and vehicular, ingress and egress and no other use." Well, I 
21 don't think that's appropriate to limit it to that. I think an 
22 easement is an easement, which means neither of them can block 
23 it. That's why I added -- I did put that language in the order 
24 that I prepared. Both of them have got to clean their crap out 
25 of the way. Both of them need to avoid blocking it, because if 
1 it's an easement by definition they both -- she owns it -- the 
2 land, arguably. He has a right to use it. Neither of them can 
3 block it by definition. 
4 MR. POWELL: And your Honor, we weren't concerned. I 
5 think we'll be able to enforce the blocking issue. We're 
6 concerned more about underground type uses. That's why I wrote 
7 "surface." So a utility easement would not be allowed, for 
8 instance. 
9 I think during -- if we're going to have 30 days on the 
10 other, I think Randy Birch and I can easily come up with 
11 agreeable language on this as well. 
12 THE COURT: You know, that's -- I think driveways are 
13 used for a host of reasons that are incidental to residential 
14 use, including for even livestock. They can be used for those 
15 purposes. It seems to me -- and, you know, utility easements 
16 frequently go under driveways. If you believe you can work it 
17 out I'll give you more time to work it out. If you want a 
18 decision today I can give you a decision today. Ultimately I 
19 hate to take away your destiny out of your hands if you feel like 
20 you can work something that's going to be a better arrangement 
21 for both of you. 
22 MR. POWELL: Although I'd like to know the -- you know, 
23 I actually would like to know the Court's opinion on this matter. 
24 I guess what your Honor was just indicating was that even if 
25 utilities were used there, it once again highlights the 
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1 importance of limiting that to 150 feet. If they could take 
2 utilities back there and if they could go back 360 feet past 
3 the gate they could reach another lot that the Court's decision 
4 has now landlocked. It is a very weighty matter for my client, 
5 and -- which is why we've taken this unusual step of substituting 
6 Counsel on, and now at this late date bringing up some of these 
7 issues. 
8 I would actually, so that my client knows, I would 
9 actually like a ruling from the Court on that today if --
10 THE COURT: Do you need time to respond to the objection 
11 in writing or --
12 MR. BIRCH: I don't think I do, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. BIRCH: I think you directed that we pay for a 
15 surveyor to prepare a legal description. The surveyor was given 
16 a copy of your decision, and the order is as it's been submitted. 
17 The 20 foot one I believe accurately reflects the order of the 
18 Court. 
19 I also believe that in this case they say, "Well, Birch 
20 didn't win -- or Lunts didn't win because the Court threw out 
21 their boundary by acquiescence." Well, your Honor, I don't see 
22 any offer of judgment where they made any offer to do anything in 
23 this matter of settlement. We -- as a matter of fact, we --
24 well, it doesn't matter. There were discussions had, offers made 
25 by my client which were rejected. There were counter offers that 
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1 were rejected. My point is they own the land. We now have the 
2 right by Court order to go across that land. I've given the 
3 Court a breakdown of costs that includes filing fees, service of 
4 process, witness fees, and in this case the aerial photos and 
5 exhibits that were related to that We would ask for an award of 
6 costs based on my memorandum that has been submitted as the 
7 prevailing party. 
8 I Counsel did point out that I inadvertently put the 38-1-
9 18, probably because I use this form on a mechanic's lien case. 
10 Clearly that's not the case. We're not asking for fees in this 
11 case We realize that that's not an option. As the prevailing 
12 party we're entitled to reimbursement of Court costs, and we 
13 would ask the Court to enter judgment for that amount. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Where is the --
15 MR. BIRCH: With regard to the other issues, I think 
16 we've addressed --
17 THE COURT* -- reference to -- I'm sorry, where is the 
18 reference to 38 in the proposed order 
19 MR. BIRCH: Your know, Counsel mentioned it. 1 didn't 
20 even see it, but I believe it's there because --
21 MR. POWELL: It's the first line in Mr. Birch's 
2 2 memorandum of costs. 
2 3 THE COURT: Oh, in his memorandum, okay. 
24 MR. BIRCH: That can be stricken because that is the 
25 wrong statute, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: I'm looking at the wrong thing Okay 
2 MR. BIRCH: Now did you have any other questions about 
3 the boundary description? You already addressed the width. 
4 We've argued about the length. Costs and the scope, I think 
5 we've addressed all of those questions. If you have any other 
6 questions for me I'd be happy to address it. 
7 THE COURT: I don't. Thank you. 
8 MR BIRCH: Thank you, your Honor 
9 THE COURT: I think it's your objection, Mr Powell, so 
10 I'll hear you last. 
11 MR. POWELL: Thank you. Just not much time here, your 
12 Honor. I would appreciate a 30-day period, as the Court has 
13 suggested, to work out the boundary issue If the Court somehow 
14 wanted to enter a provisional ruling today on the language I have 
15 proposed about the scope of the easement, I'd be happy to hear 
16 that. Finally, on the costs, your Honor, I've researched this 
17 quite a bit and I'm very surprised that I cannot find Utah case 
18 law or an AOR annotation or other annotation on the issue of 
19 costs. Rule 54 does allow the Court in its discretion to award 
20 costs, and the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs, 
21 unless the Court otherwise orders 
22 Given that it seems to my client that this case was 
23 about a large issue that the plaintiffs did not prevail on and 
24 that she has -- the Lances have incurred large costs themselves, 
25 we are simply requesting that the Court in its discretion rule 
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1 that both parties shall pay their own costs. That would be the 
2 balance of my arguments for today. Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Initially as to the 
4 scope of the easement, it's not my intent to limit its use beyond 
5 the memorandum decision that has been issued. It's -- that 
6 question was not really tried on its facts, and in my view a 
7 driveway used incidentally to residential use has a host of uses 
8 that really would be impossible for me to define. It's an 
9 easement. It can be used by the property owners for purposes 
10 that are consistent with their residential use, and those uses 
11 are very broad. I'm not inclined to grant the objection as it 
12 relates to limiting the scope of the use of the easement. 
13 As to the issue of its width, I've explained it was my 
14 intent that the width of the driveway would be 20 feet. If my 
15 written decision was not clear in that regard, the objection has 
16 brought that to the floor, and I intend to approve an easement in 
17 that width. 
18 As to the issue of the length of the easement, there's 
19 no question that measurement should commence from the gate that's 
20 referenced in the memorandum decision, and that we should measure 
21 east to 600 West. For predictability of everyone, I think we 
22 should measure from the center line of 600 West. That will give 
23 predictability to future owners. That point isn't going to 
24 change. Especially I know that there's been some concern about 
25 corners in Wasatch County and disagreements about which one 
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1 should be measured from, arid so let's measure from the center 
2 line of 600 West, whatever that is. That's my decision. If you 
3 can agree that it's 180 feet, we can put that into the order, but 
4 it's -- that's what I'm going to order. 
5 As to the issue of costs, Rule 54(b) grants discretion 
6 to the Court to award costs to the prevailing party in the case. 
7 In my view, Mr. Birch's clients were the prevailing party, and 
8 should be awarded costs in the amount that has been sought, 
9 $2,332.20. Do the findings, order and judgment on the 20-foot 
10 easement need to be changed in any way based on what I've ordered 
11 today? 
12 MR. BIRCH: I believe the only change that I perceive to 
13 be need would be that my narrative description will say -- will 
14 go 20 feet wide and 180 feet the extent -- running from the gate 
15 on the west to the center of 8th -- the center of 6th West Street. 
16 THE COURT: Right. 
17 MR. BIRCH: And so the description will need to be 
18 tweaked in that regard. 
19 THE COURT: Will you make that change? 
20 MR. BIRCH: I will have that description prepared. I 
21 will submit it to Counsel for review, and hopefully approval. I 
22 will incorporate the entire changes so that the order that's been 
23 prepared can be torn up or initiated or --
24 THE COURT: Okay. That's what I needed to know. 
25 MR. BIRCH: Okay. 
